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BACKGROUND NOTE 
THE F:C APPROACH 
The Cormnission of the European Cormnunities has nrepared a memorandum for 
the Connmmi ty' s COtmcil of Ministers, setting out an "overall approach to 
trade (for) the coming ITR.ll tilateral negotiations in C:A.IT." GAIT is the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
The following text is a slightly abbreviated version of this brief 
prepared by the Cormnission: 
The Background 
The establishment of the EEC in 1958 brought about an important exuansion 
of trade both within western Europe and between the Cormnunity and the 
rest of the world. This was to some extent due to the effect of successive 
rounds of GAIT ITR.ll tilateral trade negotiations. But the GATT system, which 
freed the post-war world from the arbitrary nature of the purely national trade 
policies of the Thirties, ceased to do justice when a large number of medium-
sized or small partners were confronted by one of far greater power. 
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Universal equality, as expressed in the most-favored-nation rule, 
contrasted too starkly with the inequality which in practice existed 
between trading nations in terms of weight and, therefore, commercial 
' 
possibilities. Hence the move toward free trade areas and customs union. 
Following the establishment of the EEC, the industrialized nations -
particularly Europe and the lmited States - agreed to mutual reductions in 
trade harriers, within modest limits in the Dillon Round, hut on an 
unprecedented scale after the lmited States Congress passed the Trade 
Expansion Act (Kennedy Round) . 
The Comrrn.mity emerged from these negotiations with the lowest customs 
tariff of any of the major trading powers, amounting to hardly wore than half 
the average of the original tariffs of its Hember States. 
The prospect and subsequent implementation of this vast work of 
liberalization, accompanied by almost uninterrupted economic expansion within 
the Community, have contributed to a remarkable expansion in international 
trade. This in turn has provided the basis for a high and stable level of 
employment and the rise in the standard of living in recent years - factors of 
considerable political significance. 
Trade Liberalization to continue 
It is now for the enlarged Community to continue the policy of trade 
liberalization to which the original Community made so significant a 
contribution, and which had suCh a profound effect on its development. 
Only thus will the Community live up to the international responsibilities 
which flow from its economic size and power. 
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Even before enlargement, the Community on several occasions expressed 
the political will to undertake wide-ranging negotiations V~Ti th its trading 
partners. In December 1971 the Council declared that "the Community is 
ready( ... ) to take part in overall negotiations on the basis of mutual 
advantage and reciprocity and requiring an effort from all the participants." 
This was confirmed by the '~Joint Declaration" which accompanied the limited 
agreement with the l~ited States of 1972, which affirmed that it was 
necessary to '~egin, and give active support to, wide-ranging multilateral 
negotiations in GATT." 
In October 1972, the SUJTmlit Conference invited the r:ommunity Institutions 
to define an "overall approach" to this negotiation by July 1, 1973 and 
expressed the hope that they would be concluded before the end of 1975. It 
is to this end essential that all the partners should undertake the preparations 
necessary to ensure that negotiations can begin as soon as possible after the 
summer of this year. 
The document which the Commission is now submitting to the Council sets 
out its proposals for an overall approach. Since the time is not ripe for a 
decision on all those negotiating points on which the Corrmamity will have 
eventually to take up a position, it confines itself to treating in general 
terms the subjects to be covered and the broad lines to he followed to arrive 
at results satisfactory for all those taking part. 
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It must, however, be clearly stated that the large-scale international 
action to which we aspire on trade would he seriously jeopardized if ways 
were not found to shield the world economy from the monetary shocks and 
imbalances which have occurred in the last few months. The present Memorandum 
deals only with trade negotiations and proceeds on the asst~tion that adequate 
machinery will be devised capable of ensuring the essential long-term 
equilibrium and stability in the monetary field. 
General Objectives of the ~egotiations 
A Council Resolution of December 13, 1g71 noted that changes in economic 
relations necessitated an overall examination of the world economic structure 
and the conditions for a new international balance, which would enable the 
standard of living to be improved by expanding international economic relations 
and liberalizing world trade to an ever wider extent. 
Starting from these general considerations, the Community's objectives 
in these negotiations are defined as follows: 
1. To consolidate and continue the liberalization of international trade 
on the basis of reciprocity and mutual advantage. 
2. To improve the opportunities for the developing countries to participate 
1n the expansion of world trade and to ensure a better equilibrium 
between developed and developing cmmtries as regards the opportunities 
for this expansion. The Community will, for its part, contribute 
actively to this objective without jeopardizing the advantages enjoyed 
by those countries with ·which the Community has special relations. 
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Industrial Customs Tariffs 
As faras tariffs are concerned, the trade negotiations must lead to a significant 
lowering of customs tariffs on industrial products. TI1e formula must be simple 
and generally applicable. 1ihile recognizing that mutual advantage and recipro-
city must be sought in the overall outcome of the whole range of the negotiation, 
e1e aim should be to seek, so far as possible, reciprocity 1n each individual 
field, in particular as far as tariff_, are concerned. 
It has been suggested that the total eliinination of all customs tariffs 
mi;:;ht be taken as a working hypothesis for these negotiations. In the present 
state of international economic relations this does not seem realistic for two 
main reasons. First, because of the extent of customs duties on certain products 
and in certain countries, which protect economic sectors that are already experien-
cing real difficulties in standing up to competition; and secondly because of the 
lack of international organization and hannonization of national policies concern-
ing, for instance, taxation, social legislation and measures to stimulate 
economic development. 
The formula for lowering customs tariffs must necessarily take into 
account the considerable differences which exist between the tariffs applied by 
the developed countries. Quite apart from tl1e question of the general level of 
tariffs, there are also structural differences. Some countries apply tariffs 
of a roughly homogeneous level to all products while others apply very high 
tariffs to some products and muci1 lower ones to others .. 
T'ne formula adopted should aim, within the overall objective of lowering 
tariffs, at leveling off the differences caused by these peaks and troughs. 
This would have the effect of creating more equitable conditions for trade and 
diminishing the present inequalities in the tariff protection of the various 
developed countries. 
I 
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This is the only approach which would make it possible to avoid a 
situation in which, following further reductions of customs tariffs, some 
would be so low that certain countries would have little hope of subsequently 
obtaining reductions in the higher customs duties which others would still be 
maintaining. 
Slashing the Peaks 
The formula for lowering tariffs should therefore be based on the principle 
of the higher the tariff the greater the reduction of customs duty. 
A threshold or floor should be set below which no reduction would be 
required, which would prevent those countries with highly diversified customs 
tariffs being obliged to lower them to such an extent that it would be 
difficult to achieve reciprocity. TI1e fonnula should take into account that 
the real level of protection has to be calculated on the basis of the value 
added. 
This general approach should in no way exclude the possibility of seeking, 
during the negotiations, on a basis of reciprocity, concessions going beyond 
the general rule and aimed at eliminating custor.1s duties on certain products. 
TI1e further lowering of customs tariffs inevitably involves a reduction 
1n the preference margin from which developing countries benefit in those 
developed countries which have introduced the Generalized Preference Scheme. 
In anticipation of the implementation of the Generalized Preference 
Schei!le by all developed countries, the Community should take steps to improve its 
own scheme in accordance with the directives given by the Conference of Heads of 
State or GovenY.lcnt in October 1972. 
• 
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Non-Tariff Barriers 
The diversity of non-tariff barriers makes it unrealistic to seek a solution 
of a general character; there must therefore be a case by case approach. 
TI1e existence of so many types of non-tariff barriers (classified by 
GATT under nearly thirty chapter headings, each subdivided into a number of 
more or less similar individual measures applied by different countries) 
seems to preclude finding solutions for all the measures listed. It is therefore 
desirable that certain types of measures be selected on which negotiation would 
take place but without excluding the possibility that other barriers may be 
added to the list in the course of the negotiations, should this prove necessary. 
Work has already begun, or will shortly begin, in GATT or the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, on subjects chosen by mutual agreement 
which will almost certainly be the object of negotiations. These consist of 
quantitative restrictioilS (including voluntary limitation of exports), 
customs valuation, licensing systems, tec1lllical standards and regulations, 
labeling and packing, export subsidies and other aids affecting corrnnerce, 
countervailing duties, and government procurement. 
Reciprocity is harder to assess over non-tariff barriers than over 
customs duties, so a broad spread of solutions will be needed to make up a 
worthwhile and well-balanced package. 
Built-in Imbalances 
Many similar measures are applied by a large number of countries and therefore 
lend themselves to multilateral solutions, whether by abolition or amendment 
or by agreement on greater harmony or discipline. These solutions may involve 
constraints of varying degrees, and may take tl1e form in some cases of inter-
pretive notes to the existing provisions of the General Agreement, and in others 
of general principles or codes of behavior. 
• 
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Although it is clearly desirable to aim at the maximum degree of balffi1ce 
between corrnnitments in each subject negotiated, it should be recognized that 
in certain subjects there are from the ontset some built-in imbalances. For 
certain measures which are applied by only one or two countries, the solution 
may take the form of a single limited decision (abolition or adaptation), 
without there being any need to lay dovm general rules. 
The Community will have to specify the non-tariff barriers of its 
trading partner which it wishes to see dealt witl1 1n the negotiations. It 
will no doubt be desirable to supplement the list of subjects with a limited 
number of other measures. 
For their part, the Corrnnunity and its Member States must also declare 
their readiness to negotiate on some of the measures they themselves apply, 
in seeking a multilateral or restricted solution. Since, in the nature of 
things, it is essentially the Member States' measures that are at issue here, 
they must agree in the near future on a sufficient number of negotiable 
measures to enable adequate reciprocity to be offered in return for those 
concessions which the Community will be seeking from its partners. 
TI1e solutions arrived at should be accepted by as many countries as 
possible if the existing imbalance between the various contracting parties 
is not to be worsened. It should therefore be made clear that any advantages 
which might derive from solutions comprising obligations gqing beyond the 
present GATT rules would be reserved for countries which in practice abide 
by these solutions (conditional application of the most-favored-nation clause). 
With this same need for balance in mind, all the contracting parties should 
cease to benefit from the exemption provided by the Protocol of Provisional 
Application. 
' 
- 9 -
The agreement reached on non-tariff barriers should include appropriate 
machinery for consultation and the settlement of disputes. This machinery 
would both deal with differences in interpretation of the agreement and with 
any outstanding difficulties not dealt with in the negotiations or with any 
non-tariff barriers which may appear after concl~sion of the negotiations. 
Expanding Agricultural Trade 
The objectives of the negotiations in the agricultural sector should be in 
harmony with the general objectives of the negotiations but should also take 
into account the fundamental and specific characteristics of agriculture. 
Two characteristics of the agricultural sector are the universal existence 
of support policies of which the internal and external aspects are 
inextricably linked and the instability of world markets. The specific 
objective of the agricultural negotiations should therefore be "the expansion 
of trade in stable world markets." 
As the structural situation is at the root of many agricultural problems, 
there should be an undertaking, in order to attain this objective, to intensify 
structural reforms so that marketing policies and price policies are based to 
a greater extent on economic considerations. 
The conditions for expanding trade would be more favorable if the 
stability of world markets was better assured. The best means of obtaining 
this objective would be the adoption of a code of good conduct covering export 
practices. For a number of specified products, complementary commitments 
could be entered into within the framework of internation arranger:1ents. 
The code of good conduct on export practices should aim at introducing 
market disciplines with concerted action on the use and scope of the rules 
agreed. 
' 
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For products such as cereals (wheat, flour, and feed grains), rice, 
sugar and the most homogeneous milk products (e.g., milk powder and butter), 
the Community will propose the negotiation of a price mechanism (including 
minimum and maxiiTRTin prices (accompru1ied by measures covering an adjustment 
of supply, including measures of storage which would, among other things, 
facilitate the application of food aid programs. 
TI1e Community considers that the best method of applying such engagements 
would be by the negotiation of international arrangements. TI1is reordering 
of world markets would make it possible to adjust certain elements of the 
import systems. 
TI1e aim of all these measures would be to promote the regular expansion 
of trade. For its part the Community would apply the instnnnents of its corrunon 
agricultural policy in such a way as to ensure that the corrunitments thus 
undertaken were respected. 
The problems caused by the harmonization of legislation covering 
both human and plant health and of the various rules on the use and treatment 
of products should also be covered in the negotiations. 
Although the measures set out above are aimed at improving world markets 
which will also benefit developing countries, the developed countries should 
also take additional action on those products of particular interest to the 
developing countries. This would for example take the form of measures of a 
preferential character, which would give these countries a chance to increase 
their export revenue. 
' 
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The Developing Countries 
The developed countries have agreed to take particular account in these 
negotiations of the interests of developing countries. That is to say, the 
developed countries will not only try to ensure that the developing countries 
do not suffer.indirect disadvantages, but will also help to expand the 
developing countries' trade and improve their export revenue. 
This was emphasized in the declaration of intent made by the Community 
on 13 December 1971, in the Joint Declaration by the United States and the 
Connnunity in 1972 and again in the connnunique of the Summit Meeting in 
October 1972 -- which also states that the task will have to be accomplished 
without detriment to the advantages enjoyed by those developing countries 
with which the Community has special relations. 
The Corrnnunity's objective as regards the developing countries in general 
should be to achieve a coherent body of measures and a balanced contribution 
by industrialized countries. 
There are, however, great differences between the levels and the 
opportunities of development in the various developing countries, so the Corrnnunity 
would wish to reserve for itself the possibility of varying its action to meet 
the particular needs of individual countries. Such variation could relate, 
in particular, to the nature of the concessions made to different developing 
countries, to the choice of products, and to a degree or ~eciprocity which 
might be required of the more advanced developing countries. 
US Should Share Burden 
In the field of generalized preferences, the Community would wish to improve 
the scheme which it has been applying for nearly two years now. But these 
improvements must be dependent upon other industrialized countries, and in 
particular the United States, introducing a scheme comparable in its effects 
with the Community scheme. 
- 12 -
Subject to this condition, the system of generalized preferences could b~ 
improved in two ways: firstly, by including a larger number of processed 
agricultural products in the list of products which benefit from preferences 
and by increasing the margin of preference for those already included; and, 
secondly, by raising the quantitative ceilings and making the detailed rules 
of application more flexible. 
The proposal mentioned earlier that there should be no reduction in 
duties below a certain level would mean in effect that a margin of preference 
for developing countries would be maintained in these special cases. 
Finally, the Corrnnunity reserves the right to propose to other developed 
countries in the course of the negotiations that by joint agreement exceptions 
to the general formula of tariff reduction might be introduced for a small 
' mnnber of products 1<hich are included in the system of generalized preferences 
and in which the less developed countries have a particular interest. 
In the field of non-tariff barriers the developed countries should 
endeavor to take particular account of the interests of developing countries 
both in adapting rules and in reducing or abolishing certain quantitative 
restrictions which especially affect exports from developing countries. 
In return, the developing countries could make a contribution which would 
be in their own interest by simplifying their administrative system for 
imports. 
In any international arrangements to regulate the markets for certain 
agricultural products, the interests of tl1e developing countries should be taken 
into account, in particlilar through efforts to lighten the burden which some of 
the provisions could involve for these countries. Food aid corrnnitrnents can be 
envisaged in the context of regulation of the markets. 
' 
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Safeguard Clause 
The object of a safeguard clause must be to enable purely transitory difficulties 
to be overcome or to give the branches of activity concerned the period of 
adaptation which they need in order to adjust themselves to the requirements of 
international competition. 
The current provisions of Article XIX (on the "escape clause") of the 
General Agreement should be maintained as they are. It must, however, be recognized 
that this Article has proved difficult to operate effectively. For this reason it 
might be advisable to supplement it, on the understanding that the countries 
concerned would retain their right to have recourse to the current provisions 
of Article XIX. Such a supplement to Article XIX could provide for it to be used 
in a selective fashion. 
This new system would on the one hand involve both greater flexibility 
in the type of safeguard measures allowed, and a limitation in the compensatory 
or retaliatory rights of the third countries concerned. On the other hand any 
country having recourse to it would have to accept increased control procedures 
and requirements relating to the conversion or adaptation of the economic sectors 
concerned. 
The scope of these supplementary arrangements might be, firstly, to prevent 
the measures from having a more extensive impact than is necessary, a selective 
application as regards the form of the measure would have to be authorized 
while maintaining non-discrimination as regards its substance. All imports which 
contribute in the same way to disorganizing the market would be dealt with in 
the same manner. Secondly, the character of the safeguard measure could vary, 
on the understandb1g that imports would not be restricted to a level lower 
than that reached during a short reference period before the measure was applied. 
' 
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Recourse to these measures should be temporary, and their mode of 
operation should be degressive. It will be a necessary condition of the 
temporary nature of the measures that agreed adjustments take place during 
the period of recourse to them. 
The right of injured countries to compensation or to compensatory 
withdrawal would be suspended provided all the conditions are fulfilled. 
Taking into account the greater flexibility thus provided for in 
these arrangements, a permanent institutional supervisory mechanism 
consisting of independent personalities should be set up to which possible 
disputes could be referred. It would be necessary to make the emergency 
procedure really exceptional. Prior notification should be demanded in all 
cases. 
